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Abstract
We examine possible impacts of demographics on outcomes of capital tax compe-
tition in political economy. For this purpose, we develop an overlapping generations
model wherein public good provision nanced by capital tax is determined by majority
voting. When a population is growing, younger people represent the majority, whereas
when a population is decreasing, older people represent the majority. We show that
the race to the bottom is likely to emerge in the population growing economy whereas
the race to the top might emerge in the population decreasing economy.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the possible impacts of demographics on the results of capital
tax competition in political economy. Given the drastic increases in capital ows across
countries and regions, many scholars have analyzed the e¤ects of globalization in the
capital market over the past few decades. One of the most important strands in this
eld is the theory of capital tax competition, which has a long history dating back at
least to Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986).1 Researchers in this strand
investigated the role of governments in attracting capital to their jurisdictions. In standard
tax competition models, governments are benevolent and maximize the representative
residents welfare. Nonetheless, they set ine¢ ciently low capital tax rates because capital
taxation causes capital ight, which increases the tax base in other countries and causes
positive scal externalities. This result is known as the race to the bottom and has attracted
much attention (see e.g., OECD, 1998).
Around the same time, we observe large di¤erences in demographic structure among
countries and drastic demographic changes in many of them. In fact, if we consider at
the old-age dependency ratio, which is the ratio of people older than 65 years of age to
the working-age population, we nd large di¤erences among countries. For example, the
2014 ratios were 9.6 in Mexico, 11.1 in Turkey, 21.6 in the United States, 27.7 in Spain,
34.4 in Italy, and 41.9 in Japan.2 Similarly, the median ages in 2010 were 26.6 in Mexico,
28.3 in Turkey, 36.9 in the United States, 40.1 in Spain, 46.4 in Italy, and 47.8 in Japan.3
Moreover, we also observe drastic changes in these gures: the old-age dependency ratios
and median ages of OECD countries rose from 13.7 to 24.2 between 1960 and 2014 and
from 28.9 to 45.4 between 1950 and 2010, respectively. These facts imply that in political
economy, decisive voters are younger generations in countries such as Mexico and Turkey,
whereas they are older generations in countries such as Italy and Japan. Moreover, they
are getting older in OECD countries. Put plainly, decisive voters and hence, the objectives
of governments might change over time and place. This would, in turn, a¤ect the outcomes
of capital tax competition.
To analyze the e¤ects of demographics on capital tax competition, we develop a capital
tax competition model involving the overlapping generations structure wherein policies are
determined by majority voting. In our model, all individuals live for two periods, young
and old, and the population grows with an exogenous constant growth rate. If the popu-
lation growth rate is positive, then the young individuals represent the majority because
their population size is larger than that of old individuals. In contrast, if the population
growth rate is negative, then the old individuals represent the majority. We consider mul-
tiple countries and each countrys government supplies public goods and nances them
with capital tax. A government chooses the level of public good provision and capital tax
rate to maximize the utility of the individuals representing the majority.
In our model, young individuals supply labor to rms, which produce private consump-
tion goods with labor and capital. The wage income of young individuals increases with
the capital inputs in the country, whereas the savings income of old individuals increases
with the rate of return on savings. Young individuals consume private and public goods
and save the wage income for old-age consumption. Old individuals consume private and
1For surveys on this strand, see Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Zodrow (2003) among
others.
2World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL
3OECD, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/trends-shaping-education-2013/median-age-going-
up-into-the-next-century_trends_edu-2013-graph43-en
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public goods. Governments at a certain period cannot commit to future policies when
maximizing the majoritys utility. This brings about a discrepancy between the govern-
ments objective and the life-time utility of individuals. Hence, capital taxation causes
inter-generational externalities, which we call the political externality. Such an externality
is positive when the individuals preference for public good consumption is strong and
negative when it is weak in both population growing and decreasing economies.
Moreover, because we assume free mobility of capital between countries, capital tax-
ation causes a positive externality, which we call the scal externality, as is standard in
models of capital tax competition. Moreover, because young individualswage income
increases with capital inputs in the country whereas old individuals savings income does
not depend on them, young individuals prefer a lower capital tax rate than old individuals.
Therefore, a government has a stronger incentive to o¤er tax-cuts on capital and this re-
sults in a stronger scal externality in a population growing economy than in a population
decreasing economy.
The relative signicance of political and scal externalities characterizes the (in)e¢ ciency
of the equilibrium capital tax rate. When individuals strongly prefer public good consump-
tion, the political externality becomes positive. Combined with positive scal externality,
it yields an ine¢ ciently low capital tax rate, i.e., we observe the race to the bottom. When
individuals do not strongly prefer public good consumption, the political externality be-
comes negative, yielding the possibility of an ine¢ ciently high capital tax rate, which we
call the race to the top. Furthermore, because the scal externality is weaker in a popu-
lation decreasing economy than in a population growing economy, we can show that the
former is more likely to exhibit the race to the top than the latter.
We also consider asymmetric countries. When the population is growing or decreasing
in all countries, we can obtain qualitatively similar results with the case of symmetric
countries. When the population is growing in some countries and decreasing in other
countries, we show a possibility that capital tax rates are ine¢ ciently low in population
growing countries and ine¢ ciently high in population decreasing countries.
Several existing papers have investigated capital tax competition in political economy
models. Persson and Tabellini (1992), Borck (2003), Lockwood and Makris (2006), Grazz-
ini and van Ypersele (2003), Fuest and Huber (2001), and Ihori and Yang (2009) assumed
that individuals have di¤erent endowments of labor and capital, and that capital tax rates
are determined by the political economy process. These papers commonly showed that if
the decisive voter s capital endowment is smaller than the average, then the equilibrium
capital tax rate tends to be high. This political economy e¤ect sometimes overwhelms the
tax competition e¤ect, which implies that the equilibrium capital tax rates become inef-
ciently high. Our paper also studies the tax competition in a political economy model.
However, in our model, individuals are not heterogeneous with respect to endowments.
Alternatively, we consider a di¤erence between generations by using an overlapping gen-
erations model. Put di¤erently, we focus on inter-generational political conict, whereas
existing studies focus on political conicts among individuals with heterogeneous endow-
ments.
We also refer to existing studies that used overlapping generations models in political
economy to investigate a macro economy. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
Tabellini (1994a, b) constructed overlapping generation models wherein individuals have
heterogeneous endowments of labor and capital, and a median voter chooses the capital
income tax rate. In these models, when the median voter has more capital endowments,
the equilibrium capital tax rate becomes lower, which raises the equilibrium growth rate.
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These papers analyzed the closed economy models and focused on the e¤ects of income
distribution on growth rates. Our paper also constructs an overlapping generation model
in political economy. However, we consider an open economy wherein capital is mobile
among countries and focus on the e¤ects of demographics on the results of capital tax
competition.
Moreover, our analysis regarding asymmetric countries relates to studies of asymmetric
tax competition, which have considered di¤erences in many aspects between regions and
countries. In particular, whereas previous studies focused on regional characteristics and
disparities in population size, technology, preferences, labor market, and initial endow-
ment, we add a new and signicant view to asymmetric tax competition by considering
international di¤erences in demographic structure.4
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline framework. Section
3 provides the various e¢ ciency properties of our model. Section 4 extends the baseline
framework by considering asymmetric countries. Section 5 concludes.
2 Baseline framework
Consider an overlapping generations model wherein time is discrete and each individual
lives for two periods. At the rst (young) period, an individual works to earn wage income,
consumes, and saves, whereas at the second (old) period, she/he does not work and spends
her/his savings to consume. At the end of the old period, she/he exits the economy. We
call a cohort of individuals who are young at time t as generation t. This economy has
M countries, and each country i (i = 1; ::M) has a population of size Lit + Lit 1, where
Lit represents the population size of generation t. We assume that the population growth
rate, n, is exogenous, and in the baseline model, we assume symmetric countries so that
n is common to all countries. Hence, we have Lit+1 = (1 + n)Lit.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals obtain utility from private good consumption, c, and public good consumption,
g. We specify the utility function as follows:
Uit = uiyt + uiot+1; (1)
where  (2 (0; 1)) is the time discount rate. The subscripts y and o represent the young
and old periods, respectively. uiy is the utility from consumption at the young period in
country i and uio is that from consumption at the old period in country i. We assume
that uij (j = y; o) is given by
uijt = ln cijt +  ln git: (2)
 is a positive constant that represents the preference for public good consumption. Budget
constraints are given by
wit = ciyt + sit; (1 + rit+1)sit = ciot+1;
where wit, sit, and r are the wage income, savings, and rate of return on savings, re-
spectively. We assume that individuals are price-takers. At period t, an individual in
4See Ogawa et al (2016) for a brief survey of the existing studies on asymmetric tax competition.
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generation t inelastically supplies her/his labor endowments, which are normalized to one,
to earn wit, and chooses ciyt and sit given all prices. At period t + 1, she/he receives
(1 + rit+1)sit and chooses ciot+1 given all prices. We assume perfect foresight regarding
individuals expectation on rit+1. Standard life-time utility maximization yields
ciyt =
wit
1 + 
; sit =
wit
1 + 
; ciot+1 =

1 + 
(1 + rit+1)wit: (3)
2.2 Firms
Firms produce the numéraire using labor and capital under constant returns to scale.
We assume perfectly competitive goods, labor, and capital markets. We employ a Cobb-
Douglas production function:
yit = L

itK
1 
it ;
where y is the output level,  (2 (0; 1)) is a positive constant representing the labor share
in production, and L and K are labor and capital inputs, respectively. Letting k denote
the capital per capita (capital-labor ratio, = K=L), prot maximization yields
wit = k
1 
it ; kit =

1  
rit + it
1=
; (4)
where  represents the capital tax rate. As is standard in capital tax competition models,
capital taxation decreases the capital per capita (@kit=@it < 0).
2.3 Market clearing conditions
In this paper, we assume that individuals are immobile between countries, implying that
the labor market is local, whereas capital is freely mobile, implying that the capital market
is global. Hence, the labor market clearing condition in country i is given by
Lit = Lit:
The global capital market clearing condition is given by
MX
i=1
Kit =
MX
i=1
sit 1Lit 1:
Because capital is assumed to be freely mobile among countries, the interest rate becomes
common to all countries (rit = rt, 8i). Then, the capital market clearing condition can be
written as
MX
i=1

1  
rt + it
1=
Lit =

1 + 
MX
i=1

1  
rt 1 + it 1
(1 )=
Lit 1: (5)
2.4 Governments
In each country, the government uses capital tax revenues to nance public good provision.
We assume that policies are determined by majority voting: the capital tax rate, it, and
the level of public good provision, git, are determined so that they maximize the utility
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of the majority at period t.5 Hence, when the population size of generation t is larger
than that of generation t   1 (Lit > Lit 1), the government at period t chooses it and
git that maximize Uit. When the opposite holds true (Lit < Lit 1), it chooses it and
git that maximize uiot.6 When deciding on it and git, governments regard past variables
(wit 1), other countriespolicies (jt and gjt), prices determined in the global market (rt
and rt+1), and own future policy (git+1) as given.7 We make the last assumption because
governments make decisions at each period, which implies that they cannot commit to
future decisions. We assume perfect foresight regarding governments expectations on
git+1, and rt+1. The following gure summarizes the structure of the model.
[Figure 1 around here]
2.4.1 Economy with a growing population
We start from the case of n > 0, which implies the population is increasing. In this case,
because Lit > Lit 1, the young individuals represent the majority of the population and
the government maximizes Uit. Plugging (2), (3) and the government budget constraint
git = itKit into (1), we obtain
Ut =  ln it   + (1 + )(1  )

ln(rt + it) (6)
+  ln(1 + rt+1) +  ln git+1 +  lnLit +
where  is dened as
   ln   (1 + ) ln(1 + ) +  ln(1  )1= + (1 + ) ln (1  )(1 )= :
The rst-order condition regarding  yields
it =

(1 + + )(1  )rt: (7)
2.4.2 Economy with a decreasing population
Next, we consider the case of n < 0, which implies that the population is decreasing and
aging. In this case, because Lit < Lit+1, old individuals represent the majority and the
government maximizes uiot. Plugging (3) and git = itKit into (2), we obtain
uiot =  ln it   

ln(rt + it) + ln(1 + rt) +  lnLit + lnwit 1 +	; (8)
5 In our setting wherein only two types of individuals exist, this corresponds to maximize the utility of
the median voter.
6When Lit = Lit 1, we assume that the government chooses to maximize Uit or uiot with equal
probability. If it chooses to maximize Uit, then the results are the same as those in the case of Lit > Lit 1;
if it chooses to maximize uiot, then the results are the same as those in the case of Lit < Lit 1. For the
sake of expositional simplicity, we omit the case of Lit = Lit 1.
7We assume that a government regards global prices as given for analytical simplicity. Such an assump-
tion would be appropriate when many countries exist. Even if we do not assume this, the governments
incentive to tax capital is di¤erent between population growing and decreasing economies. Hence, the
economy would have equilibrium ine¢ ciencies that depend on demographics as will be shown in this pa-
per.
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where 	 is dened as
	   ln


1 + 

+  ln(1  )1= :
The rst-order condition regarding  gives
it =

1   rt: (9)
Equations (7) and (9) imply that for a given rate of return on savings, an economy with
a decreasing population has a higher capital tax rate than an economy with a growing
population. Because the government regards the global price, rt, as given, capital taxation
a¤ects the utility through changes in capital tax revenues, itKit, and changes in wage
rate, wit. The former e¤ect appears in both Uit and uiot whereas the latter appears only
in Uit. Moreover, as shown in (4), capital taxation, by decreasing capital per capita, kit,
lowers wit and Uit because capital and labor are complementary in production. Hence, the
government has a weaker incentive to tax capital in a population growing economy than
in a population decreasing economy.8
2.5 Transitional dynamics
In the baseline model, we assume symmetric countries, which implies that all countries have
the same capital holdings at period 0, the same population size, and the same population
growth rate, implying that Lit = Ljt (i 6= j) for all t. From the capital demand (4), and
the capital market clearing condition (5), the sequence of capital per capita, k, can be
written as
kt =

(1 + )(1 + n)
k1 t 1 ; (10)
regardless of population growth rate. Note here that kt is common to all countries. More-
over, (3) and (4) result in common consumption levels, i.e., ciyt = cyt and ciot = cot,
8i.
2.6 Steady-state
We focus on steady-state equilibrium, wherein the level of individuals consumption, c,
and capital per capita, k, are constant over time (cyt = cyt+1 = cy, cot = cot+1 = co, and
kt = kt+1 = k
).9 Then, from (4), we readily know that rt + t = rt+1 + t+1. Using this
and (4), (10) can be rewritten as
rt + t =
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )

: (11)
The higher the population growth rate, the smaller the capital per capita becomes, which
results in higher marginal productivity of capital( i.e., higher gross rate of return on
8This result is similar to the results shown in the existing studies of tax competition with the median
voter principle cited in the Introduction, wherein the incentive of governments to impose tax on capital
increases with the decrease in the capital endowment of the median voter. In our framework, the median
voter is young individuals in the population growing economy and old individuals in the population de-
creasing economy. Because young individuals have no capital, the government has a weaker incentive to
tax capital in the population growing economy than in the population decreasing economy.
9Note here that (10) has a unique steady state. Combined with (3) and (4), this implies that there
exists a unique consumption level.
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capital). We can solve (7) and (11) to derive equilibrium  and r in a population growing
economy whereas we can use (9) and (11) to obtain equilibrium  and r in a population
decreasing economy.
2.7 Possible externalities
Here, we summarize the possible externalities emerging in our framework. The optimal
tax rate maximizes the life-time utility given by (6), implying that it is identical to the
governments objective function in a population growing economy. However, in the op-
timal, the e¤ects of capital taxation, t, on the global price, rt, must be considered in
determining t, whereas in the equilibrium, the government treats rt as given. Such a
di¤erence causes a distortion.10 More specically, capital ight caused by capital taxation
enlarges the tax base in other countries, resulting in a positive externality. This is standard
in tax competition models and we call it the scal externality. Note that rt appears in
the term  f[+ (1 + )(1  )] =g ln(rt+ it) of the governments objective function (6)
in a population growing economy and in the term   (=) ln(rt+ it) of the governments
objective function in a population decreasing economy. From this, we know that a given
over-evaluation regarding changes in r+ by the government causes smaller changes in the
objective function, i.e., the scal externality is weaker in a population decreasing economy
than in a population growing economy.
Our framework of political economy yields additional externalities. A government
chooses its current policies to maximize the majoritys utility and cannot commit to future
policies. This implies that the government in a population growing economy does not
recognize the e¤ects of the capital taxation on future variables i.e., terms  ln(1 + rt+1) +
 ln git+1 in (6), whereas such e¤ects must be internalized in the optimal. Ignoring the
e¤ects on these terms implies that the government ignores the e¤ects on old individuals
utility. Put di¤erently, capital taxation causes an inter-generational externality, which
we call the political externality in a population growing economy. Note here that capital
taxation decreases r and increases g. Hence, when  is su¢ ciently small, the former e¤ect
on the old individuals utility dominates the latter e¤ect and the political externality
becomes a negative externality, and when  is su¢ ciently large, the opposite holds true
and it becomes a positive externality.
In a population decreasing economy, the governments objective is to maximize the
old individuals utility, (8). Hence, the government ignores its taxation e¤ects on the
terms  ln it   f[+ (1 + )(1  )] =g ln(rt + it) in the young individuals utility, (6).
Thus, we again observe an inter-generational externality, which is the political externality
in a population decreasing economy. Capital taxation in a particular country, i, can
cause a positive externality by increasing ln it for young individuals within country i and
a negative externality by increasing rt + jt (j 6= i) for young individuals in the other
countries.11 When  is su¢ ciently large, the former e¤ect dominates the latter e¤ect, and
the political externality in a population decreasing economy becomes a positive externality.
When  is small, the opposite holds true and the political externality becomes a negative
externality.
10Even if a government does not regard r as given, it considers the e¤ects of  on its own countrys
welfare. In the optimal, one needs to consider the e¤ects of  , through changes in r, on the other countries
welfare and policies as well. Hence, even in this case, we observe a distortion caused by capital taxation.
11Because a change in it does not a¤ect rt + it, the negative externality is not relevant for young
individuals within country i.
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3 Equilibrium and its e¢ ciency
3.1 Preliminary analysis: closed economy
Before proceeding to the analysis of capital tax competition, we present the political econ-
omy outcomes in the absence of capital mobility. For this purpose, temporarily suppose
that capital is immobile among countries. Then, all variables become local variables and
the government takes taxation e¤ects on the rate of return on capital, rt, into consid-
eration in addition to other local variables. Moreover, because rt + t is determined by
past variables, the government now considers that any increases in  are exactly o¤set by
decreases in r (@rt=@t =  1).
In a population growing economy, Uit given by (6) is an increasing function of t
(@Uit=@t = =t > 0) under consideration of @rt=@t =  1. Therefore, the government
sets its capital tax rate as high as possible (as long as rt  0), which, combined with (11),
results in12
 imy =
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )

: (12)
The superscript im represents the case of capital immobility. In a population decreas-
ing economy, the rst-order condition for the maximization of uiot with respect to t
(@uiot=@t = =t   1=(1 + rt) = 0) yields
 imo = (1 + r
im
o ): (13)
Comparing @Uit=@t with @uiot=@t, we know that the government in a population de-
creasing economy sets a lower tax rate than in a population growing economy, if capital
is immobile between countries. Because changes in rate of return on savings absorb the
capital tax e¤ects (@rt=@t =  1), capital taxation does not a¤ect capital per capita, kit,
and hence, the wage rate, wit. The government considers such a relationship, implying
that a government in a population growing economy cares only about the level of public
good provision in maximizing Uit whereas a government in a population decreasing econ-
omy considers decreases in returns from savings when maximizing uiot as well. Thus, a
government in a population decreasing economy is more tentative in taxing capital than
a government in a population growing economy if capital is immobile.13
With tax rates in hand, we can examine the e¢ ciency properties of these tax rates by
looking at the e¤ects of a coordinated increase in  over time. Such e¤ects can be derived
by plugging t = t+1 =  into the individuals life time utility (6), taking its derivative
with respect to  , and evaluating it at  imy or at 
im
o . Plugging t = t+1 =  into (11), we
can see that the return on savings does not depend on time: rt = rt+1 = r. Equation (6)
12We obtain (11) from (5) by setting M = 1.
13Mateos-Planas (2010) analyzed the e¤ects of demographics on the mix of tax rates on households
labor and capital income by using a median voter model, and showed that when the decisive voter changes
from old individuals to young individuals, the capital tax rate increases. He conrmed the quantitative
relevance of this result by calibrating his model to United States data. Our result on capital tax rate
in the capital immobile case is consistent with this. However, he showed that when the proportion of
old individuals decreases while keeping the decisive voter type unaltered, the capital tax decreases, which
is not consistent with our result wherein a higher n and hence, a lower proportion of old individuals
implies a higher capital tax rate. Such a departure would come from the fact we endogenize governments
expenditure and ignore labor income tax whereas Mateos-Planas (2010) xed governmentsexpenditure
and introduced labor income tax.
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then becomes
Ut = (1 + ) ln    (1 + )(1 +   )

ln(r + ) +  ln(1 + r)
+ (1 + ) lnLt +  ln(1 + n) +  + (1 + ) ln(1  )1= :
Di¤erentiating U with respect to  , we obtain
@Ut
@
=
(1 + )

  
1 + r
: (14)
By evaluating (14) at  =  imy , we obtain
@Ut
@

= imy
= 


(1 + n)(1  )   1

:
Because  cannot be higher than  imy because of the non-negative constraint of r, we
know that in a population growing economy, the equilibrium tax rate is optimal if the
preference for public good consumption is su¢ ciently large (i.e.,   (1 + n)(1   )=),
and ine¢ ciently high otherwise (i.e.,  < (1+n)(1 )=). By evaluating (14) at  =  imo ,
we obtain
@Ut
@

= imo
=
(1 + )
(1 + rimo )
  
1 + rimo
=
1
1 + rimo
> 0:
Hence, we observe an ine¢ ciently low capital tax rate in a population decreasing economy.
Proposition 1 Suppose immobility of capital between countries. Then, the capital tax
rate is optimal or ine¢ ciently high in a population growing economy whereas it is
ine¢ ciently low in a population decreasing economy.
When capital is immobile between countries, no scal externality exists and therefore
only the political externality is relevant. In a population growing economy, the political
externality is positive when the preference for public good consumption, , is large and
negative when  is small. However, when  is large, both the optimal and equilibrium
requires the capital tax rate to be the maximum possible rate, implying that the resulting
equilibrium tax rate becomes identical to the optimal one. When  is small, the political
externality is negative, yielding an ine¢ ciently high capital tax rate in equilibrium. In a
population decreasing economy, only the positive political externality is relevant, making
the equilibrium tax rate ine¢ ciently low.
3.2 Economy with a growing population
Now we return to the baseline model wherein capital is mobile between countries, and
move to the e¢ ciency analysis of capital tax competition in political economy. Start from
a population growing economy. From (7) and (11), we obtain the equilibrium capital tax
rate as follows:
y =
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )
 [+ (1 + )(1  )] : (15)
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The rate of return on savings becomes
ry =
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )2(1 + + )
 [+ (1 + )(1  )] : (16)
Similarly to the previous section, we examine the equilibrium e¢ ciency properties by
looking at the e¤ects of a coordinated increase in  among countries and over time. Such
e¤ects can be derived by plugging t = t+1 =  into (6), taking its derivative with
respect to  , and evaluating it at y . Plugging t = t+1 =  into (11), we can see that
rt = rt+1 = r and @r=@ =  1. Di¤erentiating U with respect to  , we again obtain (14).
By evaluating (14) at  = y (see also (11)), we know that
@Ut
@

=y
=
(1 + )
y (1 + ry)

 [+ (1 + ) (1  )] ; (17)
where
  (1  )
h
(1 + )2 (1 + n)   (1 + n+ 2)  n (3 + ) + 

i
;

  (1 + n) (1  ) + 

1
1   + n (1  )  

> 0:
Hence, we can see that
sgn
"
@Ut
@

=y
#
= sgn [] :
Because we readily know that
@
@
= (1  )
 > 0;
implying that  is linearly increasing in . Therefore, we have a unique e that satises
 = 0, and  > 0 (resp.  < 0) for  > e (resp.  < e). Such e is given by
e   (1 + n+ 2) + n (3 + )  (1 + )2 (1 + n)


: (18)
Therefore, (17) is positive if and only if
 > e:
Proposition 2 Capital tax competition in a population growing economy results in an
ine¢ ciently low (resp. high) capital tax rate if and only if the preference for public
good consumption, , is larger than e (resp. smaller than e).
In a population growing economy, we have the positive scal externality and positive
(resp. negative) political externality when  is large (resp. small). If  is su¢ ciently large
to satisfy  > e, then the overall externality becomes positive, and capital tax competition
yields an ine¢ ciently low capital tax rate, i.e., we observe the race to the bottom. In
contrast, when the opposite holds true ( < e), the negative political externality makes
the capital tax rate ine¢ ciently high, and this externality dominate the scal externality,
resulting in an ine¢ ciently high capital tax rate, which we call the race to the top.
We can state Proposition 3.2 in a di¤erent way by focusing on the labor share in
production, . The denition of e shows that e  0 holds true if   e, where e is dened
as e  (1 + )2 (1 + n)
1 + n+  [2 + n (3 + )]
:
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Corollary 1 Capital tax competition in a population growing economy results in an inef-
ciently low capital tax rate, if   e.
A su¢ ciently small  implies higher signicance of capital in production. This implies
that the scal externality is prominent and the tax competition is likely to result in an
ine¢ ciently low capital tax rate.
3.3 Economy with a decreasing population
Next, consider a population decreasing economy. From (9) and (11), we obtain the equi-
librium capital tax rate and rate of return on savings as follows:
o =
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )

; (19)
ro =
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )2

:
To examine the e¢ ciency of equilibrium, we evaluate (14) at  = o (see also (11)),
resulting in
@Ut
@

=o
=
 [
   (1 + n) ]
(1  ) (1 + n) 
 :
This is positive if and only if
 > b;
where b is dened as b   (1 + n) 


: (20)
Proposition 3 Capital tax competition in a population decreasing economy results in an
ine¢ ciently low (resp. high) capital tax rate if and only if the preference for public
good consumption, , is larger than b (resp. smaller than b).
In a closed economy, the equilibrium capital tax rate becomes ine¢ ciently low. How-
ever, when capital is mobile, we have the negative political externality. When  is suf-
ciently small, its e¤ect becomes prominent, yielding the possibility of the race to the
top.14
3.4 Possibility of the race to the top
Next, we question when an ine¢ ciently high capital tax rate, that is, the race to the top, is
likely to emerge. Let us start from a population growing economy. Simply di¤erentiatinge, which is the threshold value in this economy and given by (18), with respect to n, we
readily know that @e=@n > 0 if and only if   , where we dene  as
  
2 +  + 1
(1 + )2
:
14We can observe that b > 0 if and only if n >  1, which always holds true. Hence, in a population
decreasing economy, we always have the possibility of an ine¢ ciently high capital tax rate.
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Thus, when the labor share is large (i.e.,   ), a larger population growth rate increases
the threshold value, e, and when the labor share is small (i.e.,  < ), it decreases e.
Moreover, because we can verify that ejn=0 < 0, we observe e < 0 and hence the race to
the bottom whenever  < . Even in the case of   , e < 0 holds true if   e (see
Corollary 1). Such a possibility can emerge because we can show that  < e.15
In addition, we can readily see that @=@ < 0 and j=1 = 0:75, implying thate >   0:75. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) estimated the global labor share and
showed that it has exhibited a relatively steady downward trend from 0:64 to 0:59 during
the past several decades. Their paper also presented the labor share for OECD and non-
OECD countries, which showed that the labor share has been under 0:7 in most cases.
Thus, it is reasonable to say that the labor share, , is smaller than 0:75, implying that
in the real world, we observe that e < 0 i.e., the scal externality is large and capital tax
competition always results in the race to the bottom in a population growing economy.
Let us move to a population decreasing economy. By di¤erentiating b, which is the
threshold value in this economy and given by (20), with respect to n, we can see that
@b=@n > 0 always holds true. In a population decreasing economy, as the population
growth rate rises, a high capital tax rate causes larger welfare losses of young individuals.
Therefore, the higher the population growth rate, the more likely it is that the capital tax
rate is ine¢ ciently high. In addition, we can see that b > 0 always holds true because
n >  1, i.e., there always exists a case wherein the capital tax rate is ine¢ ciently high in
a population decreasing economy.
If we compare a population growing economy with a population decreasing economy,
we observe a possibility that a government in a population growing economy sets an
ine¢ ciently low tax rate whereas a government in a population decreasing economy might
set an ine¢ ciently high tax rate. This can be shown in relation to Corollary 1: when  < e,
we know that e < 0 holds true and we observe the race to the bottom in a population
growing economy. However, because e, and hence b do not depend on , a government in
a population decreasing economy imposes an ine¢ ciently high tax rate on capital if and
only if  < b.16
Proposition 4 Suppose that  < e. Then, capital tax competition always yields an in-
e¢ ciently low tax rate in a population growing economy. However, it results in an
ine¢ ciently high tax rate in a population decreasing economy if and only if  < b.
As shown in Section 2.4.2, when capital is mobile, the governments incentive to tax
capital is stronger in a population decreasing economy than in a population growing econ-
omy because of a weaker scal externality. This generates a higher possibility of the race
to the top in a population decreasing economy than in a population growing economy,
which comes to the surface when  and  are su¢ ciently small.
Figure 2 summarizes the results of Proposition 4. Figure 2 (a) represents the case
wherein we always observe the race to the bottom in a population growing economy
(i.e., when n > 0) whereas the race to the top might emerge in a population decreasing
15Because @e=@n < 0, we know that e > limn!1 e. Noticing that
lim
n!1
e = (1 + )2
1 + (3 + )
;
simple comparisons yield that  < limn!1 e < e.
16Note that in deriving e, we need to use n in a population growing economy, whereas we need to use n
in a population decreasing economy in deriving b for a given .
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economy (i.e., n < 0). Figure 2 (b) depicts the case wherein we have both possibilities in
both population growing and decreasing economies.
[Figure 2 around here]
Figure 2 (a) describes the case wherein  < e. When  is small, the elasticity of the
wage rate to the capital tax rate is large, and the scal externality is large. In such a case,
the government always sets an ine¢ ciently low tax rate. In Figure 2 (b), we have   e
and @e=@n > 0. Hence, e becomes positive when n is su¢ ciently large. In this case,
the elasticity of wage to the capital tax rate is small and the scal externality is small.
Therefore, we might observe the race to the top in a population growing economy.
When  < e, we know that @e=@n < 0 holds true, i.e., capital tax competition in
a population growing economy always results in the race to the bottom and a higher
population growth rate makes the tax rate less likely to be ine¢ ciently high. In contrast,
we know that @b=@n > 0 holds true in a population decreasing economy. Therefore, when
the labor share, , is su¢ ciently small, if we increase the population growth rate, n, from
a negative to a positive value, then the possibility of the race to the top rst increases
then drops to zero when n reaches zero as described in Figure 2 (a).
Such discontinuity in the relationship between the population growth rate and the
possibility of the race to the top reects the discontinuity in the relationship between the
population growth rate and the equilibrium tax rate. As we can see from (15) and (19),
the equilibrium tax rates, y and o , rise with the population growth rate, n. Note that
when n < 0, we observe o whereas when n > 0, we observe y . Hence, as n decreases
from a positive value to a negative value, we have a discontinuous change from y to o
at n = 0. Moreover, if  is su¢ ciently small, then o jn=0 > y

n=0
holds true, implying
that the equilibrium tax rate discontinuously increases at n = 0. Hence, if we compare
a population growing economy with a population decreasing economy, the latter is more
likely to exhibit the race to the top than the former.
4 Asymmetric countries
In this section, we extend the baseline framework by considering asymmetric countries.
Consider two groups of countries (groups h and l), where group h has Mh countries
and group l has Ml countries. We assume that countries in each group have the same
population growth rate. Let nk denote the population growth rate of group k countries
(k = h; l). Without loss of generality, we assume that nh > nl. Noticing that rkt + kt =
rkt 1 + kt 1 holds true in the steady state and that the assumption of global capital
market yields rht = rlt = rt, we obtain the capital market clearing condition as
1  
rt + ht
1=
Lht +

1  
rt + lt
1=
Llt (21)
=

1 + 
"
1  
rt + ht
(1 )= Lht
1 + nh
+

1  
rt + lt
(1 )= Llt
1 + nl
#
;
where Lht and Llt are total population sizes in each group of countries and dened as
Lht 
PMh
i=1 Lit and Llt 
PMl
j=1 Ljt.
In this extended setting, we have the following three cases: (i) all countries have a
growing populations (i.e., nh > nl > 0), (ii) all countries experience population decreases
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(i.e., 0 > nh > nl), and (iii) group h countries have a growing population whereas group
l countries have a decreasing population (i.e., nh > 0 > nl). In case (i) (resp. case
(ii)), young (resp. old) individuals represent the majority in both groups of countries.
In case (iii), young individuals represents the majority in group h countries whereas old
individuals do so in group l countries.
4.1 Equilibrium and its welfare properties
Case (i): economy with a growing population
In this case, each government maximizes the young individuals utility, Uit, and the rst-
order condition yields (7) for all countries, implying that ht = lt = t. We substitute
this into (21) to obtain
rt + t =
(1 + nw)(1 + )(1  )

; (22)
where nw describes the world population growth rate and is dened as
nw  Lht + Llt
Lht=(1 + nh) + Llt=(1 + nl)
  1:
Note that we obtain (22) if we replace n with nw in (11). Therefore, we obtain the
equilibrium tax rate and rate of return on savings very similar to those shown in the
baseline framework. More specically, (7) and (22) yield
 (i) =
(1 + nw)(1 + ) (1  )
 [+ (1 + )(1  )] ; (23)
r(i) =
(1 + nw)(1 + ) (1  )2 (1 + + )
 [+ (1 + )(1  )] :
The superscript (i) represents case (i). We can obtain (23) by replacing n with nw in y
and ry (given by (15) and (16)) in the baseline framework. Hence, welfare properties in
this case are similar to those in the symmetric case. In fact, replace n in e with nw and
denote it by e(i). Then, we can see that (17) evaluated at  =  (i) is positive if and only
if  > e(i).
Proposition 5 Suppose all countries have growing population but with di¤erent rates.
Then, capital tax competition results in an ine¢ ciently low (resp. high) capital tax
rate if and only if the preference for public good consumption, , is larger than e(i)
(resp. smaller than e(i)).
Case (ii): economy with a decreasing population
When all countries have decreasing population, each government maximizes the old indi-
viduals utility, uiot, and the rst-order condition yields (9), implying that ht = lt = t.
From (9) and (21), we obtain the equilibrium tax rate and rate of return on savings as
 (ii) =
(1 + nw)(1 + )(1  )

; (24)
r(ii) =
(1 + nw)(1 + )(1  )2

:
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The superscript (ii) represents case (ii). Again, we can obtain (24) by replacing n with nw
in o and ro (given by (19)) in the baseline framework. Hence, welfare properties become
similar to those obtained in the baseline framework: (14) evaluated at  =  (ii) is positive
if and only if  > b(ii), where we replace n with nw in b and denote it by b(ii).
Proposition 6 Suppose all countries have decreasing populations but with di¤erent rates.
Then, capital tax competition results in an ine¢ ciently low (resp. high) capital tax
rate if and only if the preference for public good consumption, , is larger than b(ii)
(resp. smaller than b(ii)).
Case (iii): population growing countries v.s. population decreasing countries
In this case, young individuals represent the majority in population growing (group h)
countries whereas old individuals do so in population deceasing (group l) countries. Then,
the equilibrium tax rates become
ht =

(1 + + )(1  )rt; (25)
lt =

1   rt:
Comparing the two tax rates, we know that the equilibrium tax rate is lower in group h
countries than in group l countries. From (25), we can derive
rt + ht =
+ (1 + )(1  )
(1 + + )(1  )rt; (26)
rt + lt =
1
1   rt;
implying that
rt + ht =
+ (1 + )(1  )
1 + + 
(rt + lt) :
We substitute this into (21) to rewrite the capital market equilibrium condition as

(1  ) 
rt + lt
1=
Lht +

1  
rt + lt
1=
Llt
=

1 + 
(
(1  ) 
rt 1 + lt 1
(1 )= Lht
1 + nh
+

1  
rt 1 + lt 1
(1 )= Llt
1 + nl
)
;
where  is dened as   (1 + + ) = [+ (1 + )(1  )]. Furthermore, if we dene zt
and Ht as
zt  rt + lt;
Ht  
(1 + ) (1  )
(1 )= + Llt=Lht
1=(1 + nh) + (1 + nl)Llt=Lht
;
this becomes
zt+1 = H
1 
t z
1 
t : (27)
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In the long run, the total population size of group h countries expands whereas that of
group l countries shrinks, implying that limt!1 Llt=Lht = 0. Hence, the steady state
value of Ht becomes
H = lim
t!1Ht =

 (1 + ) (1  ) (1 + nh) :
Combined with (27), this yields the steady state value of z as
z = H(1 )= :
Plugging this into (26), we obtain the steady state values of the rate of return on savings
and tax rates as follows:
rt = (1  )H(1 )= ; (28)

(iii)
h =

1 + + 
H(1 )= ;

(iii)
l = H
(1 )= :
We substitute (28) into (14) to obtain
@U
@

=
(iii)
h
=
(1 + )(1 + + )
H
 1 

  
1 + (1  )H 1 
;
@U
@

=
(iii)
l
=

H
 1 

  
1 + (1  )H 1 
:
From this, we know that @U=@ j
=
(iii)
h
> @U=@ j
=
(iii)
l
, resulting in the following
proposition.17
Proposition 7 If group l countries set an ine¢ ciently low capital tax rate, then so
do group h countries ( @U=@ j
=
(iii)
h
> @U=@ j
=
(iii)
l
> 0). If group h coun-
tries set an ine¢ ciently high capital tax rate, then so do group l countries ( 0 >
@U=@ j
=
(iii)
h
> @U=@ j
=
(iii)
l
v). Additionally, there is a possibility that group
h countries set an ine¢ ciently low capital tax rate whereas group l countries set an
ine¢ ciently high capital tax rate ( @U=@ j
=
(iii)
h
> 0 > @U=@ j
=
(iii)
l
).
This result is consistent with that shown in Proposition 4. Put di¤erently, we again
nd that population decreasing countries are more likely to exhibit the race to the top.
4.2 Welfare di¤erence between asymmetric countries
We nally determine the group of countries that gain from tax competition in political
economy. In so doing, we assume that countries in each group have the same population
17 In fact, we have the second case when  is large. When  is su¢ ciently small, we have the rst and
the last cases. In fact, if we set  = 1=2, the rst case holds true when  is su¢ ciently large and the last
case holds true when  is su¢ ciently small.
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size (i.e., Lit = bLkt  Lkt=Mk). The indirect utility of an individual in a group k country
is written as
Ukt = (1 + ) ln kt   (1 + )(1 +   )

ln(rt + kt) +  ln(1 + rt)
+ (1 + ) ln bLkt +  ln(1 + nk) + (1 + ) ln(1  )1=
+ (1 + ) ln (1  )(1 )=   ln(1 + ) +  ln


1 + 

:
In cases (i) and (ii), we know that ht = lt, implying that
Uht   Ult = (1 + )

ln bLht   ln bLlt+  (ln(1 + nh)  ln(1 + nl)) : (29)
Thus, in these cases, we can decompose the welfare di¤erence into two terms: the rst term
represents the population size e¤ect and the second term represents the population growth
e¤ect. The larger the population size, the more the country attracts capital because of
the complementarity between capital and labor in production, resulting in a larger tax
base. Hence, individuals in a larger country can consume a larger amount of public goods
than those in a smaller country, which makes the welfare of the larger country higher than
that of the smaller country. Moreover, in a similar vein, a higher population growth rate
increases the individuals public good consumption at the old period because it implies a
larger population size of the next generation. This makes the welfare of group h countries
higher than that of group l countries.
In case (iii), the welfare di¤erence between countries becomes
Uht   Ult = (1 + ) (ln ht   ln lt) + (1 + )(1 +   )

[ln(rt + lt)  ln(rt + ht)]
+ (1 + )

ln bLht   ln bLlt+  (ln(1 + nh)  ln(1 + nl)) :
Thus, in addition to the population size and growth e¤ects, we have two other e¤ects. The
rst-term of the right-hand side of the above equation represents the tax e¤ect. A higher
tax rate increases the tax revenues and individualspublic good consumption, resulting
in a higher welfare. As we know from (25) that ht < lt, the rst term is negative. The
second term represents the capital cost e¤ect. A higher capital tax rate implies a higher
capital cost, reducing capital input per capita. This results in a lower wage rate and lower
welfare. As we know that ht < lt, the second term becomes positive.
5 Summary and discussions
In this paper, we developed an overlapping generations model wherein public good pro-
vision nanced by capital tax is determined by majority voting. When population is
growing (resp. decreasing), young (resp. old) individuals represent the majority, implying
that the governments decision depends on the demographic structure. We showed that
young individuals su¤er more from capital ight than old individuals, and that the race
to the bottom is more likely to emerge when the population is growing than when it is
decreasing. It is even possible to observe the race to the bottom when the population
is growing whereas the race to the top might emerge when the population is decreasing.
Such dependence on the outcomes of capital tax competition on demographics provide us
a new viewpoint in policy debates regarding competition for capital. Particularly, because
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we observe drastic aging in many developed countries, our results indicate an increasing
relevance of the race to the top.
We briey discuss the robustness of our results against two alternative extensions.18
First, suppose that in addition to capital taxation, the government has another instrument
to nance its expenditure. As an example, we consider labor income tax on households.
Then, the government in a population growing economy would nance its expenditure
solely by labor income tax to prevent capital ight, whereas the government in a population
decreasing economy would impose a positive tax on capital while trying to set income tax
as high as possible because it cares only about tax revenues. Moreover, we can show
that the equilibrium capital tax rate is ine¢ ciently low in a population growing economy
whereas it is so in a population decreasing economy if and only if the preference for public
good consumption is su¢ ciently large, implying the possibility of the race to the top. In
this sense, the introduction of income tax does not alter our main results qualitatively.
Second, in our framework, governments provide public goods. Alternatively, we can
assume that governments provides public inputs that a¤ect productivity of rms. In
such a case, the positive externality associated to capital taxation is further strengthened
because public inputs and capital are complementary in production. Consequently, we
always observe the race to the bottom in a population growing economy. Moreover, since
each government regards the rate of return on savings as given, it considers that the
capital tax rate does not a¤ect the old individuals welfare. This induces each government
to set the capital tax rate to maximize the young individuals welfare even in a population
decreasing economy. Hence, we observe an ine¢ ciently low tax rate in this case as well.
Hence, the introduction of public inputs would make the race to the bottom more likely
to emerge.
References
[1] Alesina A., and D. Rodrik, 1994, Distributive politics and economic growth, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 109, 465-490.
[2] Borck, R., 2003, Tax competition and the choice of tax structure in a majority voting
model, Journal of Urban Economics, 54, 173-180.
[3] Fuest, C. and B. Huber, 2001, Tax competition and tax coordination in a median
voter model, Public Choice, 107, 97-113.
[4] Grazzini, L. and T. van Yprersele, 2003, Fiscal coordination and political competition,
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 5:2, 305-325.
[5] Ihori, T. and C.C. Yang, 2009, Interregional tax competition and intraregional polit-
ical competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democ-
racy, Journal of Urban Economics, 66, 210-217.
[6] Karabarbounis, L. and B. Neiman, 2014, The global decline of the labor share, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 129, 61-103.
[7] Lockwood, B. and M. Makris, 2006, Tax incidence, majority voting and capital market
integration, Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1007-1025.
18Formal analyses on these extensions are available in online appendixes.
19
[8] Mateos-Planas, X., 2010, Demographics and the politics of capital taxation in a life-
cycle economy, American Economic Review 100, 337-363.
[9] OECD, 1998, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue.
[10] OECD, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/trends-shaping-education-
2013/median-age-going-up-into-the-next-century_trends_edu-2013-graph43-en
[11] Ogawa, H., Y. Sato, and T. Tamai, 2016, Who gains from capital market integra-
tion: Tax competition between unionized and non-unionized countries, forthcoming
in Canadian Journal of Economics.
[12] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 1992, The politics of 1992: scal policy and European
integration, Review of Economic Studies 59, 689-701.
[13] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 1994a, Representative democracy and capital taxation,
Journal of Public Economics, 55, 53-70.
[14] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini, 1994b, Is inequality harmful for growth? American
Economics Review, 84, 600-621.
[15] Razin, A., E. Sadka, and P. Swagel, 2004, Capital income taxation under major-
ity voting with aging population, Review of World Economics/Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv, 140, 476-495.
[16] Razin, A., E. Sadka, and P. Swagel, 2002, The aging population and the size of the
welfare state, Journal of Political Economy 110, 900-918.
[17] Sato, M. 2003, Tax competition, rent-seeking and scal decentralization, European
Economic Review 47, 19-40.
[18] Wilson, J.D., 1986, A theory of inter-regional tax competition, Journal of Urban
Economics, 19, 296-315.
[19] Wilson, J.D., 1999, Theories of tax competition, National Tax Journal 52, 269-304.
[20] Wilson, J.D. and D.E. Wildasin, 2004, Capital tax competition: bane or boon, Journal
of Public Economics 88, 1065-1091.
[21] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL
[22] Zodrow, R.G. and P. Mieszkowski, 1986, Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the
underprovision of local public goods, Journal of Urban Economics, 19, 356-370.
[23] Zodrow, G.R., 2003, Tax competition and tax coordination in the European Union,
International Tax and Public Finance 10, 651-671.
20
Online appendices (not for publication)
Appendix A: income tax
Suppose now that governments can impose tax on households in addition to capital tax. As
an example, we introduce labor income tax, it 2 [0; 1], into the baseline model developed
in Section 2. Such tax modies the individuals demand (3) as
ciyt =
(1  it)wit
1 + 
; sit =
(1  it)wit
1 + 
; ciot+1 =

1 + 
(1 + rit+1)(1  it)wit:
(A1)
The budget constraint of the government becomes git = itwitLit+itKit = [itwit + itkit]Lit,
which, from (4), can be written as
git =
"
it

1  
rit + it
(1 )=
+ it

1  
rit + it
1=#
Lit (A2)
=
(1  )(1 )=Lit [it(rit + it) + (1  )it]
(rt + it)
1=
:
Substituting (4), (A1), and (A2) into (6), we obtain
Uit =  ln [it (rt + it) + (1  )it]  + (1 + )(1  )

ln(rt + it) + (1 + ) ln(1  it)
(A3)
+  ln(1  )(1 )=Lit + (1 + ) ln (1  )(1 )=   ln(1 + )
+  ln


1 + 

(1 + rt+1) +  ln git+1:
Economy with a growing population
In the economy with growing population, the country i0s government at period t chooses it
and it to maximize (A3) while regarding rt and future variables as given. The rst-order
conditions yield
 0yit = 0 and 
0
yit =

1 + + 
> 0.
Hence, governments have no incentive to tax on mobile capital. Still, we can show that
such zero-tax rate on capital is excessively low and a coordinated increase in capital tax
rate can improve welfare. To see this, substitute it = it+1 =  and it = it+1 =  into
(A3) to obtain
Uit = (1 + ) ln [ (r + ) +  ]  + (1 + )(1  )

ln(r + ) + (1 + ) ln(1  ) (A4)
+  ln(1  )(1 )=Lit + (1 + ) ln (1  )(1 )=   ln(1 + ) +  ln


1 + 

(1 + r):
where r is given by (11). By keeping  as xed, a coordinated increase in  a¤ects (A3)
if evaluated at  = 0 and  = 0yit as follows:
@Uit
@

=0 and =0yit
=
(1 + + )
(1 + )(1 + n)
  ;
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where  is dened as   2= [(n  1)(1 + )(1  )  ]. We readily know that @=@ >
0 and j=1 =  2, implying that19
@Uit
@

=0 and =0yit
=
(1 + + )
(1 + )(1 + n)
   > (1 + + )
(1 + )(1 + n)
+ 2 > 0:
Economy with a decreasing population
In the economy with decreasing population, a government chooses it and it to maximize
uiot while regarding rt and past variables as given. Substituting (4), (A1), and (A2) into
uiot, we obtain
uiot = ln


1 + 

(1 + rit) (1  it 1)wit 1 +  ln (1  )
(1 )=Lit [it(rit + it) + (1  )it]
(rt + it)
1=
= ln


1 + 

(1 + rit) (1  it 1)wit 1 +  ln [it(rit + it) + (1  )it]
   ln (rt + it)1= +  ln(1  )(1 )=Lit:
Here, we know that uiot is monotonously increasing in it. To avoid the non-existence
of equilibrium rate of return on savings, we assume the upper-bound of labor income tax
 2 (0; 1).20 The government determines tax rates as
 0oit =
r (1  )
1  (1  ) and 
0
oit = :
By keeping  as xed, a coordinated increase in  , evaluated at  =  0oit and  = , results
in21
@Uit
@

= 0oit and =
= 

  
2
(1 + )(1 + )  (1 + n+ n+  0oit)
+

 0oit + (1 + )(1 + n)(1  )

:
Hence, we readily know this is positive if and only if
 > e0;
where e is dened as
e0   [ 0oit + (1 + n)(1 + )]
(1 + )(1 + n)  (1 + n+ n+  0oit)
> 0:
Therefore, if governments can impose tax on households, capital tax competition under
population growth results in an ine¢ ciently low capital tax rate, and capital tax compe-
tition under decreasing population results in an ine¢ ciently high (resp. low) capital tax
rate if the households preference for public good consumption is su¢ ciently small i.e.,
 < e0 (resp. large, i.e.,  > e).
19Note here that (11) implies that @r=@ =  1.
20When  = 1, the equilibrium rate of return on savings diverges to innity.
21Note again that (11) implies that @r=@ =  1.
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Appendix B: public inputs
Suppose that individuals obtain utility only from private good consumption, c. We specify
the utility function as follows:
Uit = ln ciyt +  ln ciot+1; (B1)
where  (2 (0; 1)) is the time discount rate. From utility maximization, we can obtain the
following equations:
ciyt =
wit
1 + 
; sit =
wit
1 + 
; ciot+1 =

1 + 
(1 + rit+1)wit:
Firms produce the numéraire by using labor and capital under constant returns to
scale. Here, we assume that public inputs raise productivity of rms. We employ a
Cobb-Douglas production function:
yit = g

itL

itK
1 
it ;
where  is a positive constant. We assume that  > . Prot maximization yields
wit = g

itk
1 
it ; kit =

gt(1  )
rit + it
1=
; (B2)
where  represents the capital tax rate. We substitute git = itKit into (B2) to get
git = 
=( )
it

1  
rit + it
1=( )
L
=( )
it : (B3)
Economy with a growing population
We start with the case of n > 0, which implies that the population is increasing. In this
case, because Lit > Lit+1, young individuals represent the majority and the government
maximizes Uit. Plugging (3), (B2), and the government budget constraint (B3) into (B1),
we obtain
Uit = (1 + )

    ln it   (1 + )
1   + 
    ln(rit + it) +  ln(1 + rit+1)
+  ln


1 + 

+ ln

1
1 + 

+ (1 + ) ln
h
(1  )(1 )= L"=( ")it
i
:
The rst-order condition regarding  yields
it =

1   rt: (B4)
Economy with a decreasing population
Next, we consider the case of n < 0, which implies that the population is decreasing. In
this case, because Lit < Lit+1, old individuals represent the majority and the government
maximizes uiot. Plugging (3) and git = itKit into (2), we obtain
uiot = ln


1 + 

+ ln(1 + rit) + lnwit 1:
In this case, the utility of the old individual does not depend on it, implying that old
agents are indi¤erent to any tax rate. Therefore, policies that maximize Uit are supported
by the majority, and the rst-order condition of the maximization again yields (B4).
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Steady-state
We assumed symmetric countries, which implies that all countries have the same capital
holdings at period 0, the same population size, and the same population growth rate,
implying that Lit = Ljt (i 6= j) for all t. From Lit = Ljt (i 6= j), we obtain cit =
cjt = ct and kit = kjt = kt. We focus on the steady-state equilibrium, wherein the level
of individuals consumption, ct, and capital per capita, kt, are constant over time (ct =
ct+1 = c
 and kt = kt+1 = k). Then, from (4), we readily know that rt+ t = rt+1+ t+1.
Using this, the capital market clearing condition (5) can be rewritten as
g(1  )
rt + t
1= MX
j=1
Lit =

1 + 
g

g(1  )
rt + t
(1 )= MX
j=1
Lit 1:
From Lit+1 = (1 + n)Lit for all countries, we obtain
rt + t =
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )

: (B5)
Equilibrium and its e¢ ciency
From (B4) and (B5), we obtain the equilibrium capital tax rate in both economies as
follows:
y2 =
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )
(1   + ) :
Plugging t = t+1 =  , the indirect utility of an agent becomes as
Uit =
(1 + )
    ln   
(1 + ) [1   + ]
    ln

(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )


(30)
+  ln

1 +
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )

  

+  ln


1 + 

  ln (1 + ) + (1 + ) ln
h
(1  )(1 )= L"=( ")it
i
:
We di¤erentiate (30) with  to obtain
@Uit
@
=
(1 + ) 
(   )   
1
1 + r
;
where r is given by
r =
(1 + n)(1 + )(1  )

  :
From this, we know that the welfare monotonically increases with the capital tax rates.
Hence, y2 is lower than the optimum tax rate.
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Figure 1 :  OLG structure of the model 
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Figure 2: Possibility of the race to the top
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